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We assessed perceptions and likely reactions of 1,005 
UK adults to a hypothetical terrorist attack involving pneu-
monic plague. Likely compliance with ofﬁ  cial  recommen-
dations ranged from good (98% would take antimicrobial 
drugs) to poor (76% would visit a treatment center). Percep-
tions about plague were associated with these intentions.
Y
ersinia pestis, the bacterium that causes plague, is a 
high-priority  bioterrorism agent (1). The pneumonic 
form of plague is of particular concern because it can be 
transmitted from person to person and is fatal if untreated 
(2). However, interventions such as isolating case-patients, 
identifying contacts, and providing prophylactic antimicro-
bial drugs may halt the spread of an outbreak (3,4). The 
success of such interventions relies on public cooperation, 
which should not be taken for granted (5). Indeed, various 
commentators have suggested that future plague outbreaks 
could result in widespread panic (2), mass public fear and 
civil disruption (1), and rioting (6).
We used a telephone survey of a sample of the adult 
population of Great Britain to assess their intended behav-
ioral responses in the event of an outbreak of pneumonic 
plague. We also assessed their perceptions of pneumonic 
plague and tested whether perceptions were associated with 
intentions.
The Study
During September 14–24, 2007, a UK market re-
search company, Ipsos MORI, conducted a random-digit–
dial telephone survey. Members of the British population 
>16 years of age were selected by using proportional quo-
ta sampling to ensure that the eventual sample of 1,005 
participants was representative of the British public (7). 
King’s College London’s Research Ethics Committee ap-
proved the study.
The full interview (including several questions not 
analyzed for this article) and results are in online Tech-
nical Appendix 1 (available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/16/1/120-Techapp1.pdf). The survey was conduct-
ed in 4 stages. In stage 1, we asked 7 questions concerning 
perceptions about pneumonic plague. In stage 2, we asked 
participants to imagine that 3 persons from their area had 
received a diagnosis of pneumonic plague. To test whether 
the origin of an outbreak affects responses, 502 participants 
were also told that police suspected bioterrorism. This ma-
nipulation had no effect on most responses. In stage 3, we 
informed participants that it was now several days later, 
that the source of the outbreak had been discovered to be 
a container deliberately hidden at a train station, and that 
>100 persons had received a diagnosis of plague. In stage 
4, we told participants about a speciﬁ  c public health strat-
egy that was being introduced. We informed 502 randomly 
selected participants about the setting up of mass treatment 
centers for persons who had been at the train station and 
told the other 503 that persons who had been at the train 
station were being asked to stay home for 7 days and to 
phone a help line if symptoms developed.
In stages 2 and 3, we asked participants whether they 
intended to undertake speciﬁ  c spontaneous precautionary 
behavior (questions 12–19 in online Technical Appendix 
1). An extra item in stage 2 asked whether participants 
would be willing to take prophylactic antimicrobial drugs 
if asked to (question 25 in online Technical Appendix 1). 
In stage 4, we asked participants how likely they would be 
to comply with advice relating to the public health inter-
ventions (questions 41–46 in online Technical Appendix 
1). Before analysis, all responses were weighted accord-
ing to participant age, sex, work status, region, and social 
grade.
As expected, precautionary behavior was more likely 
to be taken in the stage 3 scenario (Tables 1, 2). In terms 
of likely compliance with ofﬁ  cial recommendations, 983 
(97.8%) participants reported being very or fairly likely to 
take antimicrobial drugs if asked to. When asked to imagine 
that they had been to the affected train station, 379 (75.5%) 
participants reported that they would visit the treatment 
center immediately if asymptomatic; slightly fewer (331, 
65.9%) reported that they would go immediately if they 
also had inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms. This decrease appeared 
to be because participants reported that they would likely 
ﬁ  rst consult a primary care physician, hospital, or medi-
cal helpline if they had symptoms. In addition, 88 (9.2%) 
reported being likely to visit the center even if they had 
not been at the train station, and 141 (28.1%) said that they 
were likely to visit if they had not been at the train sta-
tion but had developed inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms. For par-
ticipants who had been advised to stay home, 459 (91.3%) 
reported that they would be likely to comply.
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The associations between demographic variables and 
precautionary behavior are shown in Tables 1 and 2 of 
online Technical Appendix 2 (available from www.cdc.
gov/EID/content/16/1/120-Techapp2.pdf). Associations 
between perceptions and precautionary behavior were ad-
justed for relevant demographic variables (Tables 1, 2). In 
general, participants who perceived pneumonic plague to 
be more severe, easier to catch, or more persistent in the en-
vironment were more likely to engage in precautionary be-
havior (Tables 1, 2). Table 3 in online Technical Appendix 
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Table 1. Perceptions of and precautionary behavioral responses to a hypothetical pneumonic plague outbreak affecting 3 persons,
United Kingdom, September 2007*  
Variable level, no. responses  Association, adjusted odds ratio (95% confidence interval) 
Predictor
Very or fairly 
likely 
Not very or not 
at all likely 
(reference) 
Stock up on 
food, n = 673 
(67.2%)†  
Leave the 
area, n = 132 
(13.3%)† 
Avoid others, 
n = 746 
(74.2%)†   
Seek medical 
advice,
n = 667 
(66.4%)† 
Try to obtain 
antimicrobial
drugs, n = 591 
(59.4%)† 
If someone catches pneumonic plague, they would feel unwell within 24 h 
690 149 1.7 (1.2–2.5) 1.3 (0.7–2.3)  1.4 (0.9–2.1)  1.6 (1.2–2.4)  1.7 (1.2–2.5) 
There have been cases of pneumonic plague in Britain in the past 10 y 
228 687 0.9 (0.6–1.2)  0.8 (0.5–1.3)  0.8 (0.6–1.2)  1.1 (0.8–1.6)  0.8 (0.6–1.1) 
If you come within 6 feet of someone who had pneumonic plague and was clearly ill, you would probably catch the disease 
735 237 2.8 (2.0–3.8) 1.4 (0.8–2.3)  2.1 (1.5–2.9) 2.1 (1.5–2.9) 1.9 (1.4–2.6)
If you come within 6 feet of someone who had pneumonic plague but who had not yet developed any signs of illness, you would 
probably catch the disease 
623 333 2.0 (1.5–2.7) 2.0 (1.3–3.2) 2.2 (1.6–3.0) 2.1 (1.5–2.8)  1.9 (1.4–2.5) 
Unless they receive immediate treatment, then most people who catch pneumonic plague will die from it 
767 169 1.9 (1.3–2.7) 2.7 (1.4–5.4) 1.9 (1.3–2.7) 2.1 (1.4–3.0)  1.6 (1.1–2.3) 
If antibiotics are administered immediately after a person has been infected, they would probably survive 
880 69 0.5 (0.3–1.0) 0.5 (0.3–1.0)  0.7 (0.4–1.4)  0.7 (0.4–1.3)  0.7 (0.4–1.3) 
If someone with plague has been in a room, how long would it take after they leave before it is safe to enter the room? 
  <1 d   372 0.6 (0.4–0.8) 0.4 (0.2–0.7) 0.4 (0.2–0.6) 0.6 (0.4–0.8) 0.6 (0.4–0.9) 
  1–2 d   226 1.0 (0.6–1.5)  0.6 (0.4–1.0) 0.5 (0.3–0.8) 0.8 (0.5–1.2)  1.0 (0.7–1.5) 
  >3 d   237 Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
*All odds ratios adjusted for home ownership, ethnicity, sex, age, working status, number of years of education, and social grade. Survey stage 2. 
Boldface indicates significance (p<0.05).
†Very or fairly likely to perform that behavior.  
Table 2. Perceptions of and precautionary behavioral responses to a hypothetical pneumonic plague outbreak affecting >100 persons,
United Kingdom, September 2007* 
Variable level, no. responses  Association, adjusted odds ratio (95% confidence interval) 
Predictor
Very or fairly 
likely 
Not very or not 
at all likely 
(reference) 
Stock up on 
food, n = 798 
(79.8%)† 
Leave the 
area, n = 223 
(22.4%)† 
Avoid others, 
n = 850 
(84.6%)† 
Seek medical 
advice, n = 792 
(79.4%)† 
Try to obtain 
antimicrobial
drugs, n = 724 
(72.5%)† 
If someone catches pneumonic plague, they would feel unwell within 24 h 
690 149 1.8 (1.1–2.7)  1.6 (1.0–2.5)  1.3 (0.8–2.1) 1.5 (1.0–2.4)  1.9 (1.2–2.8) 
There have been cases of pneumonic plague in Britain in the past 10 y 
228 687 1.1 (0.8–1.7)  0.9 (0.6–1.4)  1.0 (0.6–1.5) 1.4 (0.9–2.1)  0.8 (0.5–1.1) 
If you come within 6 feet of someone who had pneumonic plague and was clearly ill, you would probably catch the disease
735 237 2.5 (1.8–3.6)  1.8 (1.2–2.7)  1.8 (1.2–2.6) 2.2 (1.5–3.1)  2.0 (1.4–2.8) 
If you come within 6 feet of someone who had pneumonic plague but who had not yet developed any signs of illness, you would 
probably catch the disease
623 333 2.2 (1.6–3.2)  1.4 (1.0–2.0)  1.5 (1.0–2.1) 2.0 (1.5–2.9)  1.5 (1.1–2.1) 
Unless they receive immediate treatment, then most people who catch pneumonic plague will die from it
767 169 2.1 (1.4–3.1)  2.8 (1.7–4.7)  1.8 (1.1–2.8) 2.3 (1.5–3.4)  2.2 (1.5–3.2) 
If antibiotics are administered immediately after a person has been infected, they would probably survive 
880 69 0.6 (0.3–1.2)  0.7 (0.4–1.3)  1.1 (0.6–2.2) 0.4 (0.2–1.0)  1.0 (0.6–1.8) 
If someone with plague has been in a room, how long would it take after they leave before it is safe to enter the room? 
 <1  d  372 0.6 (0.4–0.9)  0.5 (0.4–0.8)  0.4 (0.2–0.7) 0.6 (0.4–0.9)  0.6 (0.4–0.9) 
  1–2 d  226 1.3 (0.7–2.1)  0.6 (0.4–0.9)  0.6 (0.3–1.0) 0.7 (0.4–1.2)  1.0 (0.6–1.6) 
 >3  d  237 Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
*All odds ratios adjusted for home ownership, ethnicity, sex, age, working status, number of years in education, social grade, number of people at home 
and parental status. Survey stage 3. Boldface indicates significance (p<0.05). 
†Very or fairly likely to perform that behavior. 2 shows the associations between demographic characteris-
tics and the likelihood of not complying with public health 
recommendations. Table 4 in online Technical Appendix 
2 shows the equivalent associations for perceptions about 
plague, after adjustment for relevant demographic vari-
ables. Only unnecessary visits to a treatment center were 
associated with perceptions; participants who felt that there 
had been cases of plague in the United Kingdom in the past 
10 years (odds ratio [OR] 2.3, 95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 
1.3–4.0) or who felt that asymptomatic persons might be 
contagious (OR 2.8, 95% CI 1.5–5.3) were more likely to 
report that they would visit the treatment center if they had 
not been to the affected train station, and participants who 
believed that antimicrobial drugs are an effective treatment 
for plague were less likely to report that they would visit 
(OR 0.3, 95% CI 0.2–0.6).
Conclusions
Our survey indicates that should an outbreak of pneu-
monic plague occur, the inclination of the British public 
would be to adopt a range of spontaneous precautionary 
behaviors. Intended compliance with possible public health 
recommendations ranged from excellent (taking prophylac-
tic antimicrobial drugs) to poor (visiting treatment centers). 
Some intended behavior we identiﬁ  ed might complicate 
management of an outbreak. In particular, ≈25% of poten-
tially exposed persons would not visit a treatment center, 
yet ≈10% of unexposed persons would. Given that speciﬁ  c 
perceptions about pneumonic plague were associated with 
being likely to engage in precautionary behavior, explic-
itly, clearly, and repeatedly addressing misperceptions dur-
ing the early stages of an outbreak might help reduce pub-
lic anxiety and help with decision making (8). However, 
perceptions showed few associations with willingness to 
comply with explicit public health advice.
Several caveats should be considered with regard to 
our methods. First, the large number of statistical tests that 
we conducted and the wide conﬁ  dence intervals for some 
of our results make type 1 and type 2 errors likely. Sec-
ond, our sample probably underrepresented groups who 
might be more vulnerable in the context of an outbreak, 
e.g., those who do not have access to a telephone or do not 
speak English. Our sample also consisted solely of persons 
who complied with a request to participate in a survey and 
who might therefore be more likely to comply with ofﬁ  cial 
advice during an outbreak. Our results may therefore over-
estimate likely compliance during an outbreak. Finally, re-
spondents’ difﬁ  culty in predicting how they would react to 
this hypothetical scenario also creates difﬁ  culty in assess-
ing validity of results. We therefore caution readers to treat 
our results as suggestive of the broad level of compliance 
and precautionary behavior that might occur during an out-
break of pneumonic plague, not as precise predictions.
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